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Article 8

Postcritical
Theory?
Demanding the
Possible
Jeff Pruchnic
Walled States, Waning Sovereignty
by Wendy Brown. New
York: Zone, 2010. Pp. 168, 10
illustrations. $25.95 cloth.
Cosmopolitics I by Isabelle
Stengers. Translated by Robert
Bononno. Posthumanities Series,
9. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2010. Pp. 310.
$75.00 cloth; $25.00 paper.
Fanaticism: On the Uses of an Idea
by Alberto Toscano. London:
Verso, 2010. Pp. 304. $26.95 cloth.
Envisioning Real Utopias by Erik
Olin Wright. London: Verso,
2010. Pp. 288/416. $95 cloth;
$26.95 paper.

“Post” indicates a very particular
condition of afterness in which what
is past is not left behind, but, on the
contrary, relentlessly conditions, even
dominates, a present that nevertheless also breaks in some way with this
past. In other words, we use the term
“post” only for a present whose past
continues to capture and structure it.
—Wendy Brown,
Walled States (21)
If learning to think is learning to
resist a future that presents itself as
obvious, plausible, and normal, we
cannot do so either by evoking an
abstract future, from which everything subject to our disapproval has
been swept aside, or by referring to
a distant cause that we could and
should imagine to be free of any
compromise.
—Isabelle Stengers,
Cosmopolitics I (10)
Popular reports of the demise of
critical theory in the humanities
and social sciences during the first
decade of the new century were
far from the first time the “death
of theory” had been pronounced.
However, they may have been the
first in which the enterprise was
presented as a victim of its own success. The first influential argument
of this type may have been Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri’s depiction of postmodern and postcolonial theory as little more than
“symptoms of passage” toward new
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forms of social power that appropriate the generic goals and techniques of leftist thought. As they
write in 2000’s Empire, much like
left-oriented critical theorists, international capitalism is also “bent
on doing away with those modern
forms of sovereignty and on setting
difference to play across boundaries,” the key difference being that
the latter has been much more successful in the endeavor.1
The more specific co-opting of
analytical and rhetorical forms native to critical theory by right-wing
ideologues was perhaps most poignantly outlined by Bruno Latour
in his contribution to a 2004 issue
of Critical Inquiry themed around
the journal’s colloquium on theory’s future and, in particular, the
rather discouraging coverage of the
same by the New York Times (an
article with the memorably blunt
title “The Latest Theory Is That
Theory Doesn’t Matter”2). In addressing the titular question of his
essay “Why Has Critique Run Out
of Steam?” Latour concludes that
it is not so much the operation
of critique itself that has become
moribund, but that the methodologies long associated with the
practice—the analysis of truth
claims in reference to the ideological dispositions of its claimants,
the presumption that no institutions of any real social influence
are innocent of the effects of social
power—had been shown to be
equally (more?) successful in the

hands of climate-change deniers,
libertarian-influenced conspiracy
theorists, and conservative culture
warriors of almost all stripes as they
had previously been for science and
technology studies scholars such as
Latour.3 Latour’s focus on the amateur theorizing of republican image
consultants was to become only one
of the first in a long series of such
ironic appropriations documented
in the coming years; indeed, by
the end of the decade, it was increasingly hard to feign surprise
at reports that Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari were required reading for members of the Israeli Defense Force or that Jean-Francois
Lyotard’s writings were becoming
as popular with advertising and
marketing students as they once
were with English Lit graduates.4
As always, however, the most
revealing description comes from
the loyal opposition. In a recent
interview, the conservative online
media mogul Andrew Breitbart
discusses the initial confusion he
experienced when taking courses
in American studies as a Tulane
University undergrad—“I don’t
understand what this deconstructive semiotic bullshit is. Who the
fuck is Michel Foucault?”—before
he realized the real lesson of critical
theory.5 Arguing for a fairly straight
line running from the emigration
of Frankfurt school intellectuals
to the United States in the 1930s to
the election of the “radical” Barack
Obama to the US presidency over
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a half-century later, Breitbart emphasizes the universal appeal of
identifying one’s political leanings
as oppositional to dominant culture
and, more generally, the power of
skepticism as a populist messaging
strategy. For Breitbart, the American Left have historically been
more capable at using this strategy
to their advantage, putting American conservatives at an extreme disadvantage. (Who knew that during
the same time center-left voters
were crowing about the need for
a “Democratic Rove,” at least one
conservative was hoping for the appearance of something like a “Republican Adorno”?)
Breitbart is only one of the more
vocal members of a larger group
that seemed to have learned a similar lesson and been eager to close the
lead that progressives had supposedly gained in the area of cultural
critique; from the populism-baiting
of the Tea Party, to the by-nowclichéd critiques of the “liberal
media,” to outright conspiracy
theory, skepticism, particularly on
the level of whatever is defined as
the consensus of “the elites” or of
“dominant culture,” has become as
much, if not more so, the domain
of the mainstream conservatism
than of intellectual progressivism.
Combine this shift in the discursive
turf of public politics with international capitalism’s ability to thrive
in a market of niche identities, and
the academic Left seem to be the
victims not so much of a backlash
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against ideational propriety as they
are of an outright theft of intellectual property.
And it is the visibility of this
kind of appropriation that makes
the most recent proclamations of
the death of critical theory all the
more hard to bear. If the problem
is not that critical theory’s reliance
on categories of oppositionality, resistance, and skepticism is in need
of bolstering, but rather that these
categories have turned out to be
so powerful that they work even
in the service of highly retrograde
causes, those of us interested in the
progressive possibilities of what we
have come to call critical theory
over the last several decades are left
in something of a quandary.
The popular response by the critically attuned humanities and social
sciences to this dilemma was ably
summarized by Fredric Jameson
in 2002; emphasizing that although
one of the major triumphs of critical theory was “to have discredited
‘philosophy’ in the traditional disciplinary sense,” Jameson notes that
in the early twentieth-first century
a reversal had begun, an emergent
“return of traditional philosophy all
over the world, beginning with its
hoariest subfields, such as ethics.”
Perhaps more striking today, a decade after Jameson’s writing, is the
prediction disguised as a question
that follows this observation: “[C]
an metaphysics be far behind, one
wonders (there are New Age speculations about physics that suggest
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it), if not theology itself (of which
negative theology had promised
the undermining)?”6
Jameson’s speculation here is
one we have seen roughly fulfilled
in the recent past of the criticaltheory market. The return of ethics
seen in the ascendency of thinkers
such as Emmanuel Levinas and
Maurice Blanchot around the time
of Jameson’s writing quickly gave
way to the closest we might come
to a return to theology within critical theory, the so-called postsecular
turn in theory (one that perhaps
found its most charismatic texts in
the late writings of Jacques Derrida,
but is also clearly present in the imbrication of theology and politics by
writers as Giorgio Agamben, Alain
Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek). If that
movement seems to be running
out of steam as of late—Agamben’s
2007 Il Regno el la Gloria (The Kingdom and the Glory), which in part
suggests that politics is not so much
secularized religion but religion
“fulfilled” through its own disappearance, like a snake eating its tail,
might be a fitting if not necessary
bookend—this has only made it all
the more clear that the middle term
under review here, metaphysics, has
really been the connecting thread
behind recent critical-intellectual
work all along. More precisely, we
might say that after the “death” of
theory, theorists have returned to
what Adorno called, in one of the
founding texts of critical theory,
“that question which today is called

radical and which is really the least
radical of all: the question of being
(Sein) itself.”7
Indeed, if there remains a guiding principle to politically attuned
philosophy and critical theory
today, it is what Carsten Strathausen calls “neo-left ontology.” For
Strathausen, although ontology has
returned in a big way in the work of
pivotal philosophers and theorists,
it is one in which the traditional
goal of determining categories of
transhistorical essence has notably
given way to imagining the “historically contingent construction of
a different ‘nature’ from the one we
presently inhabit” that may, in turn,
map potentials for political change.8
Strathausen presents a compelling
case for how this objective forms
at least a family resemblance if not
a coherent group identity between
a diverse range of recent work by
Ernesto Laclau, William Connolly, Jacques Rancière, the “late
Derrida,” and Fredric Jameson,
in addition to those of more obvious candidates such as Jean-Luc
Nancy, Agamben, Negri, Badiou,
and Žižek. However, it is really the
latter two—Badiou and Žižek—
who most exemplify the return to
ontology as both critique of, as well
as replacement for, the major intellectual trends of the “big theory”
error of the humanities and social
sciences (which is to say, theory as it
was commonly understood since at
least the early 1980s). Despite significant divergences on a number
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of other points, Badiou and Žižek
share an approach to bridging the
ontological and the political that is
perhaps best summarized by the
title of Simon Critchley’s Levinasand Badiou-influenced work, Infinitely Demanding.9 On one side, the
subject is “riven,” “called,” or even
“constituted” by a particular event
or course of action; on the other, its
concrete involvement in the political, or at least the involvement we
are aiming for, then emerges in a
necessary opposition to the “natural” or apparent conditions of possibility in the contemporary social
environment, a demand that exceeds what is offered by the dominant institutions of social power.
In this sense, as Adrian Johnston suggests in his excellent analysis of Badiou’s and Žižek’s theories
of political transformation, it is
useful to consider their work on
this question in relation to the old
saying often associated with May
’68: “Be Reasonable: Demand the
Impossible!” Although the increasing co-option of postmodern
or post-structuralist strategies of
critique and resistance by dominant institutions of social power
would seem to make radical and
revolutionary change ever less of
a possibility, “Badiou and Žižek
tirelessly remind their audiences
that conceptions of realistic possibilities are themselves historically
transitory constructions.”10 Such a
focus undergirds both their interests in unpacking various logics
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of identity and rupture, as well as
their shared emphasis on, if not
outright fetishization of, the power
of revolutionary moments whose
historical rarity is inversely proportional to their refiguring of social potentialities.
Although this blend of the
metaphysical and the political has
for many had the highly salutary
effect of explicitly (re)emphasizing
how the work of critical theory or
philosophy does or should intersect
with actual politics, as many critics
have pointed out, it also seems to
ignore the incremental, quotidian,
or pragmatic vectors of political action in favor of the revolutionary,
the quirky, and the ideal. In other
words, by presenting the relatively
rare revolutionary event and the
equally exceptional subjects committed to these events as their privileged examples of political change,
Badiou and Žižek often seem to
neglect the process through which
people are motivated to participate
in such actions, as well as the steps
that must occur between the static
present and the hoped-for future.
In this sense, when radical transformation is not actively happening, Badiou and Žižek’s ontological
engagement with politics can also
look much like an advocation of
spontaneous commitment (voluntarism), nonengagement (quietism), and the relentless critique of
strategies and movements that fail
to meet the rigid criteria of what
counts as change (absolutism).
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The books under review in this
essay might be taken as representative of a countermovement to the
above, an incipient and collective
rethinking of critical theory for
the present that acknowledges the
co-option of many of the strategies
associated with leftist theorizing,
but attempts to rethink the generic
objectives of critical theory itself
with stricter attention to questions
of human motivation (rather than
ideation), and that places a higher
priority on strategies for seizing on
the constrained possibilities present within existing systems of social
power than on critique as traditionally understood. In this sense,
the theorizing they offer might be
called postcritical in the way that
one of the authors, Wendy Brown,
glosses the term in her foregoing
epigraph: their ethos and angle of
approach are created through a
necessary engagement with, rather
than dismissal of, the dominant
vectors of recent critical theory.
Concerns over the current state
and future direction of critical
theory as a politically meaningful
enterprise is ostensibly a side issue
to Brown’s Walled States, Waning
Sovereignty but one inextricably
bound up with the book’s sharp,
exceedingly engaging analysis of
state power inside what she codes
“the post-Westphalian world” of
the present (21). Brown’s analysis
of the walled states of the book’s
title—namely, the increasing number of physical barriers being built

around and inside the borders of
various nation-states—forms the
centerpiece of her investigation
into the paradoxes of contemporary social power. The upsurge
of interest in such old-fashioned,
rigid mechanisms of defense would
seem, Brown suggests, rather painfully out of step not only with
the ostensibly cosmopolitan and
self-assured ethos of the countries
building them, but also with the
real capabilities and tendencies of
the two forces they are most commonly built as bulwarks against:
immigration and terrorism.
In addressing the latter, for instance, Brown finds it particularly
puzzling that “in a time featuring
capacities for destruction historically unparalleled in their combined
potency, miniaturization, and mobility” we find “these deadly but
incorporeal powers are perversely
answered by the stark physicalism of walls” (20). The disconnection between perceived threat and
proleptic defense is only part of a
broader series of troubling contradictions marking contemporary
political economy and international
relations that Brown finds embodied in border walls. Most generally,
the walls under review in the book
appear to Brown as structuring not
only the barriers between countries,
but the antinomical gap between
the idealization of a “world without
borders” by humanitarians and neoliberal politicians alike versus the simultaneous upholding of segratory
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procedures for entrance by countries that pay the greatest lip service
to openness and ecumenicity (20).
Brown finds a partial resolution in
emphasizing what is new about current instantiations of the traditional
technology of border walls: whereas
walls historically were used by sovereign nations as defenses against
other sovereign nations, nowadays
they instead “target nonstate transitional actors” (21). The specific
forces they are intended to protect
against—“migration, smuggling,
crime, terror”—are only in exceptional circumstances state sponsored or easily aligned with the
specific interests of a nation-state
(21). If walls used to symbolize the
authority and stability of a sovereign nation, they now instead symbolize anxieties over the declining
stature of nation-states as the primary political actors of the present,
the role they have formally held in
the West since the 1648 Peace of
Westphalia. More and more today,
Brown says, the walls have a “Wizard of Oz quality” about them,
staging “an image of state intelligence and control in the face of its
opposite” (25).
Brown references a variety of
such walls, both old and new, and
photographs or blueprints or ten
different national barriers are presented in the book’s introduction;
the mere listing of the variety of
these structures at various points
bears its own persuasive import
about the ambiguous purposes
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these barriers are taken to serve:
“Iran is walling out Pakistan. Brunei is walling out immigrants and
smugglers from Limbang, Malaysia. China is walling out North
Korea to stem the tide of Korean
refugees, but parallel to one section of this wall, North Korea is
also walling out China” (19). Her
most consistent examples, however,
are the “separation barriers” in the
West Bank and similar Israeli-built
structures, as well as various real
and proposed walls along the border between the United States and
Mexico. These cases do an excellent
job of demonstrating the central
point Brown returns to in Walled
States—that we are currently witnessing the migration of “key characteristics of sovereignty” away
from the traditional location in the
the nation-state and toward “the
unrelieved domination of capital
and God-sanctioned political violence” (23). Indeed, one of the particularly compelling components of
Brown’s argument is the creeping
similarity between the US and Israeli barriers. Although arguments
in the United States for the urgency
of fortifying the US–Mexico border have long been discussed via
reference to the economic impact
of undocumented immigrant laborers, more recently debates over
border fortifications to both the
South and the North have increasingly referred to the possibilities
of “Islamic” terrorists exploiting
inadequately defended entryways.
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Similarly, whereas the West Bank
barrier and its predecessor structures have long had theocratic implications, more recently its role as
a barrier to the flow of goods and
services has gained much attention. The 2007 documentary film
9 Star Hotel (by Ido Haar), for instance, follows a group of young
Palestinian men who cross illegally
into the Israeli city of Modi’in to
work construction jobs. (Brown
also mentions the striking example
of a complaint by the member of
an illegal Israeli settlement against
the proposed path of the barrier’s
extension; she was worried that it
might block the route taken by her
Palestinian maids in reporting for
work.)
Interrogations of the relationship between these three forces—
theopolitics, capitalist economics,
and sovereignty—center each chapter of Brown’s relatively slim volume. After an outlining of the
paradoxes symbolized in our contemporary “passion for wall-building” (“Waning Sovereignty, Walled
Democracy”), the second chapter, “Sovereignty and Enclosure,”
traces the emergence and refinement of the concept of sovereignty
in the West through the works of
such figures as Hobbes, Jean Bodin,
Locke, and Rousseau. Here, Brown
presents a concise, compelling reading of nation-state sovereignty as
the political force that marks “the
temporal end and spatial limit of
the sovereignty of nature or God”

(56) while also attempting to “detach political life from the demands
or imperatives of the economic”
(58). If Westphalian sovereignty
was shaped by the subordination
and regulation of the religious and
the economic, then we should not
be surprised to see its decline result
in the redistribution of powers to
both of these other domains. This
history also helps explain a recent
resurgence in attempts to position
nation-state sovereignty in theological terms. As Brown writes, “[A]s
it is weakened and rivaled by other
forces, what remains of nation-state
sovereignty becomes openly and
aggressively rather than passively
theological” (62). Or, as she puts it
more bluntly elsewhere, “[S]overeignty needs God more as its other
sources and powers thin and its territorial grip falters” (63).
The admixture of the religious
and the political that emerges when
sovereignty is threatened, Brown
suggests, most often appeals to
the “decisionist” or “exceptional”
power of the sovereign entity as
sovereign entity, a concept now
popularly associated with the work
of Carl Schmitt, and one very much
opposed to the tradition of popular legislative power prominent in
the works of Locke and Rousseau.
(Brown does not have to expend
much more effort than quoting the
second President Bush, who often
appears as something like a vaudevillian Carl Schmitt in Walled States,
to emphasize the recent return of
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“absolutist” power in American discussions of sovereignty in the recent
past.) However, even a monarch
seems outperformed by the market in these times; after all, there
are few examples of “sovereignty
without the sovereign” better than
global capitalism, a force that often
appears, Brown suggests, to approximate “a god’s power to make
the world without deliberation or
calculation” (65). The uneasy interaction between the waning nationstate and the rising theopolitics
and global capital is detailed in
the third chapter of Walled States,
which takes up the ways in which
walls alternately demonstrate the
effects of state-generated discourses
of fear and danger, as well as the
popular desires and fantasies of its
citizenry (“States and Subjects”).
The concluding chapter (“Desiring Walls”), presents an even more
sustained (and psychoanalytically
inclined) focus on the latter, mapping the “psychic reassurances or
palliatives” that walls offer modern subjects suffering the anxieties
attendant to the decline of nationstate sovereignty. Here, Brown
draws extensively on Freud’s study
of religion in The Future of an Illusion (1927), leaving readers with a
depiction of nation-state walls as an
inversion of that book’s title, “not
the future of an illusion, but the illusion of a future aligned with an
idealized past” (133).
Several early responses to
Walled States questioned whether

645

the book’s reading of sovereignty
might have aged rather abruptly
in light of the events now known
as the Arab Spring, populist uprisings that started about a month
after the text’s publication. These
clashes seemed to bring back to
the forefront the more procedural
legacies of Westphalia (including
policies of noninterference between
nation-states), as well as the power
of at least the idea of popular sovereignty, one consistently invoked
by participants in the Arab Spring
and one that might seem too easily
dismissed by Brown as, in her own
words, “if not a fiction, something
of an abstraction with a tenuous
bearing on political reality” (49).
However, if the discourses and actions of the citizenry seemed to
suggest a great viability of popular
sovereignty as a motivating factor,
one could equally point to the actions on behalf of sovereign figures
themselves—warnings that theocratic or terroristic groups were
behind such uprisings or would fill
the void created by the absence of
a strong ruler, invocations of anarchy or disappearance of the nationstate, frequent references on behalf
of all parties to how such incidents
might disrupt the “global economic
recovery”—as confirming Brown’s
larger analysis of the psychic economy surrounding questions of
sovereignty and the impositions
of global capitalism and theopolitics onto its territories. Perhaps
the more interesting question on
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this score is the more generic one:
What relationship do we expect (or
desire) between such phenomena
and Brown’s text as an instance of
theorizing (and thus itself an abstraction) and critique (and thus
an analysis into the often hidden
conditions and consequences of the
forces behind such phenomena)?
This question is itself one also
very much under review within
Walled States; in addition to reflecting on her own methodological approach multiple times in the
text—“[W]hat does it mean to treat
nation-state walling as a theoretical
object when it does not emerge and
exist in the world as such?” (27)—
Brown also wonders whether much
of recent critical theory in general,
with its focus on the discursive, the
contingent, and the hidden, can adequately address such obvious and
physical manifestations of social
power as border walls (80). Indeed,
contemporary walled states seem to
function, Brown writes, as a rebuke
not only to “every liberal hope for
a global village”—the low-hanging
fruit for any leftist critique of this
type—but also to “every post-structuralist theorization of power” (81).
While Brown references Derrida,
Foucault, and Deleuze amongst
others as examples of participants
in the latter endeavor, more recent
critical work on the question of
sovereignty, specifically by the likes
of Agamben and Hardt and Negri,
hardly fairs better in her estimation; indeed, in a piece published

prior to Walled States on similar
subject matter, she suggests that
much “left and liberal theoretical sovereignty talk” may be little
more than “a search for a kind of
Viagra for the political.”11 If critical
theory has devoted the majority of
its intellectual efforts to teaching us
about the immaterial and elusive
symbology of power as it functions
in language, science, the psyche,
etc., perhaps it has prepared us less
well to deal with such obvious and
material manifestations of social
power as the literal walls expanding across the globe.
In this sense, it might be said
that the psychoanalytic analysis
that forms the final chapter of
the text, though perhaps the best
example of Brown’s reliably powerful argumentation and phrasing, undercuts the book’s more
consistent strengths. Comparing
the walls under review to Anna
Freud’s study of ego defense—in
both cases the defenses thrown up
against fear of external threats end
up (re)defining the very thing they
are meant to protect—is undoubtedly appropriate, but in some ways
detracts from Brown’s suggestion
that the paradoxes of contemporary
sovereignty reside in plain sight; in
other words, the same point seems
to have been already made without
needing the help of a psychoanalytic
detour such as this one. Although
the walls discussed in Brown’s
text reside physically between nation-states, she also suggests they
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mark an “in-between” of modes
of power, “a global interregnum”
that designates a “time after the
era of state sovereignty, but before
the articulation or instantiation
of an alternate global order” (39).
Though it is the great benefit of
this text to encapsulate this transition moment within its analysis, we
might also posit Brown’s approach
here as itself marking a transitional
moment in critique of its type. If
paradox is the rule rather than exception in the contemporary politics of sovereignty, its exposure or
revelation seems to not so much
inhibit or negate its power but offer
lessons regarding its “uses” in various contexts. Thus for instance, in
interviews around the time of the
publication of Walled States, Brown
has more explicitly addressed the
“huge space for the Left” opened
by renewal of populist anger and
ad hoc organizing, even if most
recently these areas have (on the
American scene at least) been
dominated largely by conservative
and reactionary groups.12 In this
sense, then, the contribution Brown
makes via Walled States may be to
mark off a transitional moment not
only in the concept of sovereignty
within the political imaginary but
also within the movement of leftpolitical theorizing and critical
praxis.
On this score, and in regards
to the larger question with which
we began, it was highly enlightening to read Walled States, Waning

647

Sovereignty in conjunction with
recent works by Alberto Toscano,
Isabelle Stengers, and Erik Olin
Wright. If Brown’s text can be read
as a diagnostic of the transitional
moment of global social power and
a concomitant reconsideration of
the role of critique and left-theorizing, these texts similarly combine
these objectives while pushing toward more specific rethinkings of
the role of intellectual abstraction
in politics as a whole (Toscano), the
formation of attachments between
people and new constellations of
thought and knowledge (Stengers),
and the appropriate strategies for
forwarding egalitarian political
goals (Wright).
Alberto Toscano’s Fanaticism
is a far-reaching study of the various ways that its title subject, one
Toscano cleanly defines, following Hegel, as “enthusiasm for the
abstract,” has driven intellectual
history and populist politics (xi).
Emphasizing the identification of
fanaticism with a commitment to
abstract principles, as opposed to
our knee-jerk associations with
religion or the irrational, allows
Toscano, on the one hand, to emphasize the historical flexibility of
the term, notably the role of ostensibly “anti-fanatical” or “neutral”
discourses, such as secularism or
the “free market,” to function as fanaticisms in their own right. On the
other, it also allows Toscano to underscore the long history of fanaticism as a concept within political
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philosophy and cultural theory,
disciplines that have consistently
attempted to identify the relationship between ideational abstraction
and concrete action, as well as to
sort out fanaticism from its more
benevolent cousins: enthusiasm,
partisanship, and commitment.
The former of these objectives
is well served by Toscano’s wideranging survey of the “uses of the
idea” of fanaticism from the Enlightenment onward. And Fanaticism’s topics and sites are indeed
expansive; the first chapter (“Figures of Extremism”) alone moves
from a consideration of American
abolitionist struggles, to revolts
against British colonialism, to the
emergence of the “politics of passion” as a sticking point in twentieth-century political thought (as
seen in the works of Francis Fukuyama, Michael Walzer, Peter
Sloterdijk, and Badiou, amongst
others). Chapter 2 (“The Birth of
Modern Politics Out of the Spirit
of Millenarianism”) takes up the
legacy of the German Peasants’
War of the early sixteenth century
and considers how its historical
condemnation influenced twentieth-century radical thought (and,
in turn, largely set the stage for critiques of fanaticism within revolutionary political strategy generally).
The third chapter (“Raving with
Reason: Fanaticism and the Enlightenment”) presents a striking
reading of the centrality of debates
over fanaticism, “enthusiasm,” and

related concepts within the thinking of key Enlightenment figures.
Chapter 4 (“The Revolutions of the
East: Islam, Hegel, Psychoanalysis”) expertly rereads Hegel’s writing on Islam as part of a broader
consideration of the religion’s use as
the reliable default image of fanaticism for the West. Finally, chapter
5 (“The Cold War and the Messiah:
On Political Religion”) engages the
postsecular turn in recent critical
theory and the general resurgence
of popular interest in the relationship between politics and religion
in recent times.
As mentioned, part of the value
of such a broad, diverse inquiry
into discourses “of” and about fanaticism is its emphasis of the ambiguity of the term; readers may be
surprised to discover, for instance,
the consistent depiction of antislavery activists prior to the Civil War
as fanatics, a charge memorialized,
amongst other places, in the title of
William Drayton’s 1836 The South
Vindicated from the Treason and
Fanaticism of the Northern Abolitionists. Similarly, though Enlightenment philosophes may reside in
the popular imagination as helping to usher in the age of reason,
Toscano is quick to remind us of
Edmund Burke’s accusation that
their own “horrible fanaticism”—
their application of atheistic and
abstract philosophizing to social
questions—was “a thousand times
more dangerous than that inspired
by religion” (quoted on xvii).
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However, it is important to
note that Toscano’s main objective in this survey is not simply to
suggest that the concept has been
bankrupted by ambiguous and
contradictory use over several centuries (yesterday’s fanatic is today’s
arbiter of reason), nor to forward
some weak version of cosmopolitanism to counter our predispositions to dismissing others under
the name of fanaticism. Rather,
Toscano argues that we need not
so much resist claims of fanaticism
as to understand the crucial role,
perhaps the necessary one, of it as
a force in political change and to in
turn become better at finding ways
direct its energies for strategic purposes. Thus, for instance, Toscano
does not deny that American abolitionists were fanatics; rather, he
emphasizes how their fanaticism
emerged from an understanding of
the weakness of deliberative politics
on this issue and “was thus both a
matter of passionate conviction and
mediated strategy, combining the
attractions of symbolism and affect
with the instruments of power and
calculation” (10).
Toscano’s intervention here is
perhaps best understood via his
careful tracing of the legacies of Enlightenment thought on fanaticism.
As Toscano writes, one can roughly
discern two philosophical perspectives on the subject that emerged
from debates over enthusiasm and
fanaticism in key Enlightenment
thinkers: one that positions it “as
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the outside of reason, the persistent
threat of pathological partisanship
or clerical irrationality” and the
other that takes “some unconditional and unyielding abstract passion as intrinsic to a universalizing
rationality and emancipatory politics” (xvii). It is not hard to guess
which of these two positions, which
Toscano aligns roughly with the respective endowments of Voltaire’s
Lumières and the Aufklärung of
Kant, has received the most support
in contemporary populist political thought. Indeed, Toscano finds
many contemporary representatives of the “bad” Enlightenment
marking various corners of current
political debate, notably those who
participate in the West’s long reliance on Islam as our default image
of fanaticism and thus forward
“the widespread belief that we are
experiencing the repetition or continuation of that struggle between
reason and unreason, freedom and
subjection, knowledge and ignorance which was first played out
in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries in Europe” (101).
Although Toscano finds similarly problematic invocations of
fanaticism-as-dismissal in some contemporary critical theory (Sloterdijk’s recent “psychopolitical” writings
and Žižek’s rather depressing take
on Islam come under fire), he identifies the turn to religious ideas of
redemption in the works of Derrida and Badiou as more salutary
attempts “to evade the critiques of
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universalism as fanaticism while
not giving up an iota of the radicality demanded by a transformative, oppositional and emancipatory
political thought” (245). Derrida’s
effort in this regard in Specters of
Marx (1993) is found lacking, however, largely due to his allergy toward the ontological and historical
materialist dimensions of his own
subject matter. Although, for Toscano, Badiou fares much better in
this regard, his understanding of
political commitment and its role
in revolutionary changes seems to
elide considerations of strategy and
context. Or, as Toscano phrases
it, “[A] certain passivity functions
here as an antidote to the censures
that inevitably greet a Promethean
subjectivity that seeks to change
the world on the basis of a truth it
claims to possess” (246).
Thus, although he is broadly
sympathetic to Badiou’s writings
on ontology and commitment, Toscano’s handling of these topics in
Fanaticism is, at least for this reader,
much more patient and pragmatic.
This may be because Toscano’s approach is in many ways a reversal
of that taken by Badiou in regards
to the historical dimensions of political change. As Toscano explains
early in the text, the relationship
between fanaticism and history is
inherently paradoxical. On the one
hand, the disruptive force of fanaticism is out of necessity tied to its “explicit refusal of history as a domain
of gradualism and mediation” in

favor of an uncompromising devotion to abstract principles (xxi). On
the other, however, it cannot have
a disruptive effect without also relying on a conception of history as
“a naturalized dimension of predictable combinations” to which it
can be opposed. Badiou’s approach
to this dilemma largely works toward abstracting the elements of
radical change from its occurrences
in recorded history: searching for
a transhistorical formulation that
captures the emergence of worldchanging events within history.
Toscano might be taken as working in the opposite direction, toward a historicizing of abstraction
and placing a greater emphasis on
precisely the pull or allure of abstraction and its role in the politics of various historical contexts.
Importantly, this difference in approach saves Toscano from having
to determine a method for sorting
out “good” and “bad” instances of
radical commitment that might
seem to follow the same formulist
pattern, and to instead focus on the
possible “uses” of not only the “idea
of fanaticism” but how more generalized force fields of enthusiasm,
affective attachment, and commitment might be used in shaping the
politics of the present.
In Toscano’s final analysis,
then, our anxieties about fanaticism are themselves a symptom of
a larger problem we have with accepting radical commitment to the
abstract as a component of political
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thought and as a motivator of political praxis. As he writes near the
book’s closing, “[A]ttempts to assert some abstractions (such as political equality) against others (such
as monetary equivalence), require
that we find ways of connecting a
politics founded on the refusal of
compromise with the openings or
closures provided by contemporary
capitalism” (251). Only by finding ways to work on and through
the forces of fanaticism, to “tune”
our own and others’ devotions to
various abstractions, can we hope
to respond effectively to times of
crisis wherein such commitments
proliferate.
Determining precisely how
such attachments occur and the
underpinnings of abstraction itself
within human cognition and sensemaking is a major focus of Isabelle
Stengers’s Cosmopolitics I, the English translation of the first three
books of a seven-volume series
that has already been published in
French. In this text, Stengers largely
picks up from where her previous
work, The Invention of Modern Science, left off.13 In the final chapter of
that text, Stengers argued for a “return to the sophists” via a rereading
of the sophist Protagoras’s famous
statement declaring that “man is
the measure of all things”; contra its
popular interpretation as advocating a certain necessary relativism
in regards to our understanding of
the world, Stengers suggested we
might do better in considering the
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immense responsibility projected
by that position and our need to
recognize the role of belief in scientific investigation and discovery.
Cosmopolitics I also begins with an
invocation of what Stengers calls
“nonrelativist sophists,” but she
shifts ground somewhat in clarifying more specifically the distinction between what she calls “the
politics constitutive of the sciences”
as opposed to “a general politics of
power.” The former designates the
identification of scientific invention via its separation from myth
and opinion, what Stengers refers
to as the “event constituted by the
creation of a measurement.” Such
an event, Stengers reminds us, is
different than its reduction as “an
illustration of the right and general
obligation to subject all things to
measurement” (11). Framed more
generally, Stengers’s overarching
concern is not so much to question
the validity of any specific aspect of
modern science as it is to ask after
how such validation within science,
which here might be only our most
obvious category of thought systems
that claim universality, often comes
at the expense of discrediting claims
and practices outside of itself.
Stengers has two primary approaches to this problem throughout Cosmopolitics I: a rethinking of
the nature of scientific production
(so that it might obtain an identity
that is not reliant on the disqualification of the “nonscientific”) and
a relatively more novel attempt to
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thematize the role of “symbiosis” in
not only scientific practice but social life (specifically the accidental
or strategic ways in which the interests of different actants intersect
or complement each other). If the
first of these maintains Stengers’s
position as one of our most brilliant practitioners of science studies scholarship, the second is what
gives an unusually broad reach to
the politics of the book’s title and
Stengers’s more general cosmopolitical, as opposed to cosmopolitan,
approach. If cosmopolitanism presumes the possibility of a shared
common world, Stengers proposes
instead political strategies based on
the manipulation or creation of opportunities for symbiosis between
individuals and collectivities that
do not rely on ideational consensus
or the synthesis of disparate goals
or beliefs.
These two objectives—a critique of the conceptual imperialism of modern science and a
thematization of the politics of social symbiosis—might not seem to
naturally complement each other,
but one of the great accomplishments of Stengers’s work in Cosmopolitics I is to demonstrate how
the same process of reconceiving
science as an “ecology of practices”
rather than an exclusively epistemological or metaphysical domain
can also be leveraged to rethink
the formalisms that limit our political imaginations. As with Toscano, Stengers’s approach might

be also best understood in contrast
to another thinker who has many
of the same objectives. Much like
Bruno Latour, Stengers tends to
emphasize the creative power of
scientific discoveries—the ways in
which the naming of a substance
or recognition of the relationship
between different properties have
their own material consequences
and in a sense concretely change
our contemporary reality. Latour’s
emphasis, however, has most often
been on the ostensible epistemological novelty of this viewpoint. For
instance, Latour has emphasized
the “backward causation” of scientific discoveries, the ways in which,
to use one of his most popular examples, although airborne germs
can’t be said to have an identity
prior to Pasteur’s work in 1864
made them “known” to humans,
it is possible to say that, after 1864,
“airborne germs were there all
along.”14 Stengers, too, follows the
novel logic of scientific “discoveries,” as well as the ways in which
some more pivotal instance of the
same give birth to entirely new
fields that in turn not only “add”
to reality, but shape the ways in
which we are intended to order or
understand reality “itself.” Thus,
for instance, Stengers turns more
than once to the discovery of the
neutrino as a pivotal moment in
the formation of a “revolutionary
physics” in which contradictory
observable phenomena can be justifiably discounted.
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Stengers’s more urgent concern,
however, is the way in which such
changes in what “counts” and what
can be contested in science tend to
become delocalized and imported
into other domains, impacting
what counts in society as a whole or
crowding out other disciplines and
less formal forms of cognition and
abstraction. Stengers’s stand against
the becoming-generic of science,
however, is no call for a prophylactic skepticism or general advocation of relativism. In regards to the
former, she continually identifies
the need to “escape from a generalized polemic that puts every practice in a position of disqualifying
and/or in danger of being disqualified” as the unique problem that
guides her critique of modern science (58). The possibility of relativism or pleas for simple tolerance as
viable alternatives are also concisely
dismissed in a provocative aside in
Cosmopolitics I in which Stengers
wryly identifies capitalism as “the
only truly tolerant and relativist
undertaking that I know of”: “It
alone is capable of radically aligning disparate practices and value
only to turn against those whose
destruction would be of interest to
it; for it is radically indifferent to
whatever binds them and is itself
bound by nothing” (74). (Anyone
who might mistakenly think this
association is meant to speak well
of relativism need do no more than
read the title of Stengers’s more
recent collaboration with Phillipe
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Pignarre, Capitalist Sorcery: Breaking the Spell.15)
Rather, Stengers suggests that
recognizing the material and processual nature of modern science
might also lead us toward political
strategies that require neither nihilism nor “the recognition of a more
powerful interest before which divergent particular interests would
have to bow down” (34). This,
then, is perhaps the most succinct
connection between Stengers’s depiction of science as an “ecology
of practices” and her forwarding
of dynamic ecology as a political
model. As Stengers writes, despite
our tendencies to personalize and
formalize ecology, it does not “understand consensus but, at most,
symbiosis, in which every protagonist is interested in the success of
the other for its own reasons” (35).
Such a perspective, not despite but
because of its depersonalization,
may actually be a better model for
crafting social change because it
does not require us to “enlighten”
oppositional groups toward our
epistemological or ethical correctness, but instead gives us the burden of creating novel and strategic
alliances that capitalize on the overlap of respective desires.
Despite their large differences
in their ostensible subject matter,
the same general strategy, and the
concept of symbiosis as a model,
is very much the driving force of
Erik Olen Wright’s Envisioning
Real Utopias, a work that, like all of
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the works reviewed in this essay, is
profitably considered as an attempt
to rethink the possibilities of critical theory given the challenges of
the present. Wright, however, is by
far the most systematic in his approach to this endeavor, and a great
strength of his work in this text is to
simultaneously place great faith in
the power of “emancipatory social
science” to make positive change in
the world while at the same time
insisting on pragmatic, some might
even say modest, goals for it in the
near future.
The general framework of Envisioning Real Utopias follows what
Wright stipulates to be the three
essential tasks of emancipatory social science of any era: “elaborating
a systematic diagnosis and critique
of the world as it exists; envisioning viable alternatives; and understanding the obstacles, possibilities,
and dilemmas of transformation”
(10). Wright gently suggests at
many moments in the text that the
first of these activities—critique
itself—has traditionally received
the highest priority and claimed
the lion’s share of ink from critical
theorists over the last half-century.
Thus, while acknowledging the
necessity of the diagnostic vector
of “emancipatory” scholarship, as
well as providing a lucid, concise
example of the same in a chapter
with the almost-charming title
“What’s So Bad about Capitalism?” Wright’s fundamental focus
is on the second of these three tasks:

the creation of alternative models
of social and economic life. These
are the “real utopias” of the book’s
titles, case studies of “actually existing” socialist forms of cooperation,
such as participatory budgeting
practices in Porto Alegre and the
cooperative governance structure
of the Mondragón Corporation.
Wright’s turn to “real utopias”
here is meant as a way to preserve
many of the objectives of Marxist
social theory while jettisoning any
remaining teleogical visions of the
failure of capitalism and its replacement by collective ownership of
the means of production. Instead,
Wright draws our attention to
the hybrid forms of socialism and
capitalism that already exist within
contemporary economies; subsequently he suggests that emancipatory scholars should switch
their emphasis to designing what
Wright calls a “socialist compass,” a
metric for determining, first, what
potential changes in the political
economy will take us closer to our
emancipatory goals and, second,
which strategies are viable within
the specific contexts of different
countries and existing economic
systems.
Wright’s careful attention to
context leads him to suggest, for instance, that forwarding of a guaranteed basic income might ironically
“be more sustainable in a society
with a strong consumerist culture,
since people in such a society are
likely to have strong preferences
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for discretionary income” (221).
Envisioning Real Utopias is full of
counterintuitive, but ultimately
persuasive arguments such as these,
most of which preserve an undoubted optimism about potential
solutions to economic injustices but
focus on incremental, short-term
goals as starting points. At the same
time, however, this tempered approach is likely to disappoint readers who, understandably, might
have less patience about the pace of
the proposed changes under review,
as well as Wright’s more specific
suggestion that some socialist goals
are decidedly “off the table” given
the political orientations of some
countries and communities (147),
or his insistence that, “in order to
gain the virtues latent within a
capitalist organization of economic
structures,” some version of capitalism may be a necessary part of any
sustainable economic system (162).
Similarly, many of Wright’s
key examples—Mondragón, Porto
Alegre—will already be familiar to
readers of left-oriented sociology,
and others might be found wanting.
In the latter category, it is particularly hard to accept Wright’s contention that the open-author online
encyclopedia Wikipedia demonstrates “a profoundly anti-capitalist
way of producing and disseminating knowledge” and is based on the
egalitarian principle “to each according to need, from each according to ability” (3). It is not so much
that Wright is incorrect here—it

655

is certainly true that Wikipedia has
emerged as a striking example of
the productive power of unremunerated collective labor—but it
seems a bit much to hold it up as
“profoundly anti-capitalist,” particularly, as Wright reminds us many
other times in Envisioning Real Utopias, as capitalism is too diverse and
protean a system to be identified
(and one might then also suggest,
be opposed) in its “pure” form.
In the final analysis, however,
what makes Wright’s book so provocative is not so much the examples
he forwards as “viable alternatives,”
as his unwavering insistence on viability itself as a criterion for emancipatory thought. Wright’s strongest
statement on this score is in the final
section of Envisioning Real Utopias,
covering the third and final task of
“transformation” that he assigns
to emancipatory social science. In
four brief but compelling chapters,
Wright details the role of theories
of structural change in political
thought and three generic models
of the same. Although Wright gives
a fair hearing to the strengths of the
first two, more traditional, forms—
coded as the “ruptural” and the
“interstitial”—both are eventually
dismissed for, respectively, presuming they can “smash the state”
as the locus of social power or for
ignoring its importance altogether.
Instead, Wright proposes “symbiotic transformation” as a guide for
emancipatory programs, strategies
that “seek to create the conditions
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for positive collaboration” between
groups with opposing interests
(306).
As one might expect given
Wright’s large amount of previous
research on class and the general
(post-)Marxist bent of Utopias, two
key “opposing interests” here are
those of capitalists and those of the
working class. Specifically, Wright
proposes a particular kind of “class
compromise” in which “the associational power of the working class
and the material interests of capitalists” can be combined in actions
that benefit both in the short term
and lead to greater social equality in
the long term (338–39). Although
not entirely restricted to strategic
overlaps of this type, Wright’s general notion of symbiotic strategies
relies on designing solutions to concrete social problems that generally
increase the power of the working
class in some way and thus take us
in the direction of more egalitarian
social arrangements even as they
serve the immediate needs of an
often unjust capitalist society. Coming at the end of the book, Wright’s
proposal includes a brief rereading
of economic history to emphasize
the ways in which such symbiosis
has served progressive aims in the
past and also gives us a lens for rereading the more contemporary
examples of “real utopias” covered
earlier in the book.
Wright’s frequent use of the
word “compromise” (class-based or
otherwise) gives easy ammunition

to those who would dismiss his vision of emancipatory action as already “compromised,” his approval
of “hybrid” economies, baby-step
socialism, and class symbiosis as
corrupt from the start. However,
it is precisely Wright’s out-of-step
relation to more militant egalitarian
theories of the past, and the “revolutionary fetish” of current progressive thought as seen in the works of
writers like Badiou and Žižek, that
might make his work one of the
more radical entries into contemporary critical theorizing. As already
suggested in this review, Wright’s
work in this regard might be taken
as only the most explicit statement
of an undercurrent at work in all
of the texts reviewed here, with his
real utopias and symbiotic strategies
only a more systematic articulation
of the thinking behind Brown’s diagnosis of the transitional state of
contemporary social power, Toscano’s recuperation of abstraction and
fanaticism as necessary rather than
abject components of contemporary
politics, and Stengers’s own suggestion of the symbiotic as a postcritical
rejoinder to the impotence of relativism and the ubiquity of oppositional claims and interests. All find
their power in a certain beleaguered
acceptance that the traditional tools
of leftist critical theory have been
co-opted by the right, but also in a
rededication to finding immanent
modes of engaging the problems
of contemporary politics despite
the potential compromises it might
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entail. Or, as Stengers phrases it,
they are all joined in a “gamble that
the present still provides substance
for resistance, that it is populated by
practices that remain vital even if
none of them has escaped the generalized parasitism that implicated
them all” (10).
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